This paper uses new tariff data to re-evaluates the extent to which South Africa has liberalised its trade from the late 1980s. The paper finds that significant progress has been made in simplifying South Africa's tariff structure and reducing tariff protection, but further progress can be made in removing tariff peaks, reducing tariff dispersion, and lowering the anti-export bias arising from protection. Further, although protection has fallen, the decline has been no faster than in other lower-middle-income economies. The paper also finds that estimates of the level of and change in nominal and effective protection are sensitive to the choice of tariff measure (collection duties or scheduled tariff rates) and Input-Output or Supply-Use table, but that the sectoral structure of protection is largely unaffected.
Introduction
THE EXTENT OF THE IMPACT OF TRADE LIBERALISATION on poverty is dependent on the extent of liberalisation as well as the sector biases thereof. During the 1990s, the democratically elected government initiated substantial reforms of the trade regime. Most importantly, these included new government's participation in the GATT Uruguay round, which culminated in an Offer to the WTO to substantially liberalise the tariff regime. 1 However, the overall impact of these reforms on the level of protection is subject to a lively academic debate. Fedderke and Vase (2001: 447) 1998 than in 1988" . In response to this, Rangasamy and Harmse (2003:721) (RH henceforth) re-evaluate the data of FV as well introduce new data and conclude that "… to argue that more of South Africa's output has been subjected to increased levels of protection during the 1990s is not only incorrect but is also a misrepresentation of facts" (Rangasamy and Harmse, 2003: 721) . Similar sentiments on the extent of liberalisation are expressed by some businesses and labour who have argued that industry "… has been cruelly lashed by the harsh winds of competition introduced through trade liberalisation -specifically lowering of tariffs" (Seboni, 2005) . No consensus has been reached and the question remains: "Has South Africa liberalised its trade?" One of the reasons for the lack of consensus has been the unavailability of detailed tariff data for each year during the 1990s. This paper assembles a consistent set of tariff data at the Harmonised System (HS) 8-digit level for the 1990s and uses this data to evaluate the extent of liberalisation in South African industries during this period. In this analysis, the paper also identifies key sectors that have been and are most likely to be subject to significant future liberalization. The information on tariff liberalization is also used in other studies forming part of the Trade and Poverty Project. Various different indicators of protection are presented. These include nominal protection rates, effective protection rates and measures of the anti-export bias of protection. The paper also extends the work of FV and RH by analysing the sensitivity of measures of protection, particularly effective protection, to the choice of tariff measure, production structure and non-tariff barriers in agriculture. Finally, liberalisation in South Africa is benchmarked against a range of developing and developed economies.
(FV henceforth), for example, argue that "… the much-hyped liberalisation of the South African economy in the 1990s has not been fully realized. … more of South Africa's output is protected by tariffs in
The paper finds that significant progress has been made in simplifying the tariff schedules and reducing tariff protection, but further progress can be made in removing tariff peaks, reducing tariff dispersion, and lowering the anti-export bias arising from protection. The decline in protection has not been even, with relatively large declines in protection found in labour intensive industries. However, these sectors remain relatively highly protected according to both nominal and effective protection measures. Further, although average protection has fallen, the decline has been no faster than in other middle-income economies. The paper also finds that estimates of the level and decline of effective and nominal protection are lower when using collection duties compared to scheduled tariff rates, but the structure of protection across sectors is similar.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of trade liberalisation in South Africa. Section 3 critiques existing empirical estimates of protection in South African industries. Section 4 discusses the data used in the study and sections 5, 6 and 7 present the results of the data analysis. Section 8 presents a cursory analysis of the correlation between changes in protection and output, employment and trade flows. Section 9 concludes the paper.
A brief history of trade liberalization in South Africa
The primary focus of this paper is trade reform during the 1990s. Liberalisation of South Africa's trade regime prior to the 1990s is well documented and the reader is referred to Holden (1992) , Bell (1992 Bell ( , 1997 , Belli et al. (1993) , Jenkins et al. (1997) and WTO (1994 WTO ( , 1998 WTO ( , 2003 for further information. A chronology of various reforms from the early 1970s is also presented in Table 1 .
Prior to the 1980s, South Africa's trade and industrial policies were aimed primarily at encouraging import substitution industrialisation. During the 1920s, South Africa was one of the first countries to adopt explicitly import substitution as a vehicle for industrialisation (Belli et al., 1993; Jenkins et al., 1997) . Protection was initially used to encourage the substitution of imports of consumer goods by domestic manufactures. However, once this 'easy phase' had been completed the focus shifted towards import replacement in upstream industries, particularly the chemical and basic metals subsectors (Fallon and Pereira de Silva, 1994) . Strategic intervention (Mossgas, Sasol) to reduce the dependence of South Africa on imports of products such as liquid fuels further shaped the composition of domestic production.
By the 1970s, South Africa remained highly dependent on gold as a source of foreign exchange (Jenkins et al., 1997) . Concerns regarding this dependency led to the "Reynders Commission of Inquiry" in 1972 which emphasised the need to diversify into non-gold exports through export promotion methods. Further, rapid growth through exports in some of the newly industrialised countries of South East Asia helped diminish the export pessimism of the 1950s and 1960s (Jenkins et al., 1997) . These forces, amongst others, initiated a shift in trade policy in the early 1970s towards a more open regime.
Protection during the import substitution industrialisation phase was largely achieved through a wide-ranging system of quantitative restrictions rather than tariff-based protection (Belli et al., 1993) . The first shift away from import substitution industrialisation in 1972 thus began with the relaxation of quantitative restrictions (QRs) and the introduction of an Export Development Assistance scheme. Although increases in tariffs compensated for the relaxation of QRs, Bell (1992 Bell ( , 1997 argues these were not fully compensatory resulting in a net decline in protection. However, the overall trade policy remained protectionist as the incentives introduced were an attempt to redress some of the anti-export bias rather than shift the economy towards export orientated growth (Jenkins et al., 1997: 7) .
During the 1980s, the picture becomes more confusing. While the relaxation of QRs continued into the 1990s, import surcharges implemented in response to balance of payments pressures arising from the debt crisis in the mid-1980s raised protection. Furthermore, there was an increase in the number of applications for protection in the form of ad valorem and formula duties as businesses experienced the effects of the economic downturn (Bell, 1992) . Evidence suggests that by 1988 the economy had become more protected than in 1984. Using effective protection rates, Holden (1992: 187) estimates a 30 % weighted average effective protection rate in 1984 with a range between 7 % and 143 %. By 1988 the average had risen to 70 % while the range had widened to between 9.9 % and 348 %.
2 Belli et al. (1993) also note that by the end of the 1980s South Africa had the most tariff rates, the widest range of tariffs and the second highest level of tariff dispersion compared to a range of developing countries. [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] Export Development Assistance scheme introduced. Substitution of tariffs for QRs resulting in net decline in protection (Bell, 1997 (Bell, ). 1979 Rise in gold price resulting in the appreciation of rand.
1980
Reinforced system of export incentives.
1983-85
Proportion of value of imports subject to QRs fell from 77% to 23% over period. Relaxation of import permits by switching from a positive list to a negative list. Real depreciation of rand . [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] Proportion of tariff items subject to QRs fell from 28% in 1985 to less than 15% in 1992.
September 1985
Introduction of 10% import surcharge on all imported goods not bound by GATT. August 1988 Differential surcharge rates applied to Luxury goods (60%), Capital goods (10%), Motor vehicles (20%) and Intermediate goods (10%).
• Increased applications for ad valorem and formula duties by businesses (Bell, 1992) 1989 "Structural adjustment programmes" involving a system of duty free imports for exports implemented for motor vehicles and textiles and clothing. 1990
• General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) introduced. Provided a tax free financial export subsidy to exporters based on the value of exports, degree of processing and local content of the exported product.
1990-91
Reduction of import surcharges to 40%, 5%, 15% and 5% Bell (1992 Bell ( , 1997 , Belli et al. (1993) and WTO (1993 WTO ( , 1998 WTO ( , 2003 .
During the following 6 years, the implementation of the 'structural adjustment programmes' for motor vehicles, clothing and textiles, the introduction of GEIS and the reduction of import surcharges substantially reduced the level of protection. By 1994 the process of reducing QRs was largely complete and the focus of trade reform shifted to import liberalisation through tariff reductions. This process was spurred by South Africa's commitment in the GATT Uruguay Round to bind 98% of all tariff lines, reduce the number of tariff rates to six, to rationalise the over 12000 tariff lines and to replace quantitative restrictions on agricultural products with tariffs. Export subsidies, which were incompatible with the WTO, were also phased out and finally terminated in 1997.
In addition to multi-lateral liberalisation, the government has also engaged in a number of bilateral and regional trade agreements culminating in the SA's implementation of the SADC Free Trade Protocol and the implementation of the South Africa-European Union Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) in 2000. Recently tentative discussions on free trade agreements have also commenced or been concluded with MERCOSUR, India and the United States.
The debate on liberalization in South Africa during the 1990s
The overall impact of tariff liberalisation on protection during the 1990s, however, has been subject to much debate. While it is generally accepted that nominal protection has fallen, as noted in the introduction, the impact on effective protection is unclear. Effective protection measures the net effect on protection after taking account of protection on output and the cost raising effects of protection on intermediate inputs. The lack of consensus in the debate reflects a number of data and methodological limitations.
Firstly, estimates of nominal and effective rates of protection are influenced by the choice of protection measure. Few studies account for the effect of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which were prevalent in many sectors, particularly agriculture, clothing and textiles, prior to the mid 1990s. 3 The quantity of imports of agricultural products were largely controlled by marketing boards under the Marketing Act of 1937 and 1968 and only marginal tariffs were imposed on imports.
Secondly, the level and change in protection is sensitive to the use of scheduled tariff rates, as found in the tariff book, or collection rates, calculated using tariff revenue collected by the State. 4 Collection rates, as used by FV, under-estimate protection as the quantity and therefore value of imports is not independent of the tariff rate. In the extreme, imports may be driven to zero by a prohibitive tariff. Such protection is not accounted for when using collection rates. In addition, collection rates are affected by exemptions, rebates and drawback of duties, which have been particularly prevalent in clothing (Altman, 1994) and motor vehicles. 5 This also biases collection rates downwards.
Scheduled rates, as used by RH, are generally a preferred measure of nominal protection, but may exaggerate protection if significant smuggling occurs and rebates are granted. The extent of rebates and smuggling needs to be sufficient such that the suppliers do not price up to the import parity price. The main problem with the RH study is that they do not use applied tariff rates for the period 1999. Protection for 1999 is estimated by the IDC (1996) using the tariff phase-down offered to the WTO. It is therefore difficult to draw many conclusions on the extent to which protection has fallen during the 1990s on the basis of the estimates used by RH, although the direction of the change is probably correct.
A further shortcoming of many studies is that they do not account for protection offered by surcharges that have been implemented at various stages from the 1970s, largely in response to balance of payments pressures. 6 Surcharges have a marked effect on the level of protection, as is shown in Figure 1 which measures the ratio of duty collected (including and excluding surcharges) to merchandise imports. The inclusion of surcharges close to doubles protection as measured using collection rates in the early 1990s. Finally, protection through the prolific use by South Africa of antidumping duties has also not been studied. 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 Incl s urcharges Excl s urcharges Source: Own calculations using Reserve Bank data (Reserve Bank, various years).
Given these limitations, no definitive conclusion with respect to liberalisation during the 1990s can be drawn. In the following sections new data (collection duties and scheduled tariff rates) are introduced and nominal and effective rates of protection during the 1990s are re-calculated. The sensitivity of estimates of protection to changes in nominal tariff rates (collection data and scheduled rates) and the choice of Supply-Use or Input-Output table is also analysed.
Data
For the purpose of this study a coherent set of industry level tariff rates was constructed for the period 1988 to 2004. In constructing this data set, numerous problems needed to be dealt with.
Firstly, the estimation of protection levels at an industry level is made complex by the various types of customs duties used by the South African authorities. The types of customs duties include ad valorem, specific, mixed, compound and formula duties as well as their combinations. 7 Up to the late 1990s formula duties and mixed duties were often used to set a lower bound free-on-board (f.o.b.) price for imported products and were particularly prevalent within the clothing and textile sectors. As a result the ad valorem equivalent of these tariffs could be extremely high. For example, the IDC (1990) estimated ad valorem equivalent tariff rates in 1990 in excess of 1000% for some products at the Harmonised System (HS) 8-digit level.
6 Surcharges were first used in April 1977 to 1979 in response to the cessation of capital inflows in response to the Soweto riots in 1976. They were reintroduced in the 1980s in response to the debt crisis. 7 Three types of mixed duties are applied, for example: (a) 25% or 70c/kg, (b) 325c/kg with a maximum of 39% and (c) 22% or 27% with a maximum of 2880c/kg. In applying the mixed tariff, the higher of the two rates are applied. Formula duties were designed to combat "disruptive competition", but have been phased out as South Africa has adopted an anti-dumping framework (WTO, 1998: 39) . An example of a formula duty is: 10% or 255c/kg less 90%. In this example, if the f.o.b. import price falls below 255c/kg, additional duties are levied to raise the effective import price to this value. The ad valorem equivalent of the formula duty converges to infinity as the f.o.b. price converges to zero.
A second problem associated with calculating protection rates is the prevalence of quantitative restrictions during the early 1990s, particularly within the agriculture, food, beverages, tobacco, clothing and rubber sectors (WTO, 1994: 77) . Although tariffs rates, usually specific tariffs, were applied to these products, these were primarily to generate revenue once an import quota had been granted. 8 Failure to account for protection through non-tariff barriers will lead to an under-estimate of protection, particularly prior to the mid 1990s.
Finally, estimated protection levels vary enormously depending on whether scheduled tariff rates, collection duties and surcharges are used.
Given the complexity of measuring protection within South Africa from the late 1980s, two estimates of protection are used in this study. Firstly, protection is measured using scheduled tariff rates at the HS8-digit level. Secondly, protection is measured using collection duties at the HS6-digit level, calculated by dividing customs revenue by the import value. Both the scheduled tariff and collection duty rates are adjusted to include surcharges calculated at the HS8-digit level using surcharge revenue obtained from Quantech (2004) .
The scheduled tariff rates are obtained from the Trade Analysis and Information System database (TRAINS), the Economic Research Division of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and Trade and Industry Policy Strategies (TIPS). Missing years are updated using the South African Government Gazettes. Customs revenue at the HS8-digit level is obtained from Customs & Excise (made available from TIPS) and the FV study. A concordance file obtained from TIPS is used to calculate the simple average tariff rates according to the SIC system used in this analysis.
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Because of the prevalence of non-ad valorem tariffs, it was important to include some estimate of the protection afforded by these tariff rates. The calculation of ad valorem equivalents for non-ad valorem duties requires f.o.b. prices for the products, often at the HS8-digit level. Although it is possible to use cost-insurance-freight (c.i.f.) prices, which can be calculated by dividing import values by import volumes, these are highly variable, even at the HS8-digit level (Jansen and Joubert, 1998) . As an alternative, formula and mixed duties are replaced by collection rates if the latter exceeded the ad valorem component of the scheduled rates. This process under-estimates protection levels as highly protected products may not be imported and exemptions on duty are frequently granted. In the case of mixed tariffs such as "22% or 27% with a maximum of 2880c/kg" the upper ad valorem rate (27%) is used. Finally, specific tariffs are replaced with the collection rate. It was not possible to estimate the ad valorem equivalent of non-tariff barriers, which were prevalent in some sectors prior to 1994. However, coverage of import controls tended to apply to products already liable to high tariffs, with the exception of agriculture (WTO, 1993: 77) . Moreover the sectors in which import licensing was eliminated were also those experiencing large reductions in tariffs (Jonsson and Subramanian, 2000) . The reduction in tariffs may therefore serve as a reasonable proxy for the decline in protection within these sectors. Table 3 ).
Nominal protection
While the number tariff lines have fallen, there is still scope for further simplification of the tariff structure. The number of ad valorem tariff bands remains high (38 in 2004 for Most Favoured Nation (MFN) countries) and still exceeds the 6 tariff rates proposed in South Africa's GATT/WTO Uruguay Round offer. If non-ad valorem tariff bands are included, the number of different rates in 2004 rises to 100.
10 Approximately 1.2% of MFN tariff lines in 2004 are still subject to nuisance tariffs (tariff level exceeds zero, but is less than or equal to 2%) and could be reduced to zero with little impact. Tariff dispersion, as reflected in the coefficient of variation, also remains relatively high (1.4 for MFN duties in 2004). The dispersion of tariffs is also shown in the increased percentage of domestic "spikes" (tariff > 3 times the economy wide average) in total tariff lines from 3.7% in 1994 to over 8.5% in 2004. Finally, the signal for domestic resource allocation has been diluted by the implementation of the various trade agreements (SA-EU TDCA and SADC Free Trade Protocol) which has resulted in separate MFN, EU and SADC duties.
To evaluate the change in nominal protection during the 1990s, Table 3 presents the simple average scheduled tariff rates and collection rates for 1994, 1998 and 2003/4. The averages are presented for the 1-digit SIC groupings (manufacturing, agriculture and mining) as well as for 32 industrial sectors.
11 The rates for 1994 include the average surcharge rate which is presented in column 1. A comparison of the scheduled rates and the collection rates in Table 3 and Figure 2 reveals the downward bias in level and decline in protection when using the latter. Collection rates are on average 40% lower than the scheduled rates in 1994, but this difference declines to less than 5% in 2003/4. 12 In both cases overall protection fell from 1993. According to the scheduled rates, the simple average tariff rate, inclusive of surcharges, fell from 22% in 1994 to 7.9% in 2004. Protection according to collection rates declined from 13.6% to 6.1%, with most of the decline arising from the removal of surcharges. Since 2000, most of the decline in average protection has arisen from liberalisation in accordance with the SA-EU Free Trade Agreement and the SADC Free Trade Protocol, with little progress made in reducing MFN tariffs.
13
Turning to the estimates of nominal protection at the sector level, the data reveals wide variations in the level of and change in protection across sectors. While estimates of the level of protection are also sensitive to the choice of collection duties or scheduled rates, the sectoral structure of protection and the change in protection are largely unaffected. Simple pairwise correlation coefficients for manufacturing exceed 0.73 in all cases. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients are higher (0.81 for changes in protection and in excess of 0.91 for the level of protection between 1994 and 2004). This suggests that while the results of FV under-estimate the decline in protection during the 1990s, the sectoral bias may be limited.
Average nominal protection fell in all sectors using both scheduled and collection rates, but relatively large declines (over 15% using scheduled rates) were experienced in beverages, textiles, footwear, wearing apparel and communication equipment (Table 4) . Low declines (less than 5% using scheduled rates) in protection were experienced in wood products, paper products and basic iron & steel sectors. Sectors in which moderate declines in protection (5-10%) were experienced account for over 50% of manufacturing GDP, irrespective of whether collection of scheduled rates are used. Despite the decline in overall protection, nominal protection using scheduled rates remains high in wearing apparel, tobacco and footwear where average tariffs exceed 20%. Finally, the tariff structure has been simplified significantly, as shown in the increased proportion of HS8-digit tariff lines under ad valorem duties for all sectors (Table 3) .
Overall the results therefore indicate widespread reductions in nominal tariffs from 1994.
12 Large biases are evident in Wearing apparel, Textiles and Motor vehicles as a result of the extensive use of rebates and drawbacks. 13 Average protection using scheduled rates rose from 1990-93. This reflects the tariffication of non-tariff barriers in food and rising protection within the clothing and textile industry under the revised Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1992 and 1993. As argued As argued by GATT (WTO:170) 24%  26%  42%  44%  45%  65%  53%  56% 81%  …1-5%  12%  11%  6%  6%  5%  0%  7%  6%  3%  …6-10%  11%  12%  5%  8%  7%  4%  9%  8%  6%  …11-20%  33%  21%  17%  16%  32%  26%  18%  22% 9%  …21-30%  17%  12%  7%  22%  6%  5%  9%  4%  1%  …>30%  3%  17%  22%  5%  5%  0%  4%  4%  0% Notes: Calculations based on tariff schedules including ad valorem equivalents. a. Domestic tariff spikes are defined as those exceeding three times the overall simple average applied rate. b.
International tariff spikes are defined as those exceeding 15%. c.
Coefficient of variation is calculated as the standard deviation divided by the overall average.
d.
Nuisance rates are those greater than zero, but less than or equal to 2%. 13.9 7.9 6.3 -6.7
Food [301] [302] [303] [304] Note: Change in tariff rates are calculated as (t 1 -t 0 )/(1+t 0 ).
Effective Protection and anti-export bias
While nominal tariffs reflect protection on final output, they are an imperfect proxy for protection on value added. For example, value added within a sector may become more protected if protection on intermediate inputs declines relatively rapidly compared to protection on its output. To assess the impact of trade liberalisation during the 1990s on value added, this section therefore presents estimates of effective protection that measure the protection provided to domestic value added relative to value added in international prices (Greenaway and Milner, 1993) , i.e. 
where V j * is the domestic value added to final product j at tariff distorted prices, V j is the value added under free trade, t j is the tariff on outputs, t i is the tariff on inputs and a ij is the quantity of intermediate Although subject to severe methodological limitations (Holden and Holden, 1975; Holden and Holden, 1978; Greenaway and Milner, 1993; Anderson, 1998; Holden, 2001) , ERP are still widely used to evaluate the structure of protection and therefore the potential for resource allocation across sectors (Greenaway and Milner, 2003) . We hence proceed with the analysis.
In calculating ERP, the estimates of value added in international prices and the production coefficients (a ij ) take into account exports that are sold abroad at international prices. Further, the Balassa (1965) approach is followed and non-traded products are given a zero tariff rate.
Sensitivity of ERP to Input-output or Supply-use tables
A severe shortcoming of the FV and RH studies is that their estimates of ERP are based on a single outdated Input-output SSA, 1995 SSA, , 1999 SSA, , 2001 SSA, , 2002 SSA, , 2003 .
14 The sector classification of the IO and SU tables are based on the 4 th and 5 th editions of the SIC system and are therefore not directly comparable. To facilitate comparability, these tables were reduced to 43 industrial sectors that are roughly consistent with the classification presented in Table  3 .
15 Figure 3 compares the weighted average ERP for manufacturing between the period 1988 to 2004 using the various IO and SU tables. Estimates based on both scheduled tariff rates and collection rates are presented. As is shown in Figure 3 , estimates of ERP are very sensitive to the selection of IO or SU In conclusion, the choice of IO or SU tables affects estimates of the level of effective protection, but has a marginal impact on the sectoral structure of protection and the change in protection over time.
Changes in ERP by sector
To compare changes in ERP over time, a table of ERP is constructed drawing on all the available IO and SU tables. 16 The ERP values for 1988 and 1989 are drawn from 1988 and 1989 IO tables, respectively. The ERP values 1993 are drawn from their respective SU tables. The interim years are calculated as a weighted average using the estimated ERP of the two tables that bound the period.
17 Table 5 -4.7 -6.3 -2.3 -2.0 4.6 -3.2 -5.0 -1.8 -1.6 3.6 Other producers [98] -2.4 -3.2 -1.7 -1.5 1.7 -1.7 -2.5 -1.2 -1.1 1.5 General government services [99] -2.3 -3.2 -1.3 -1.1 2.1 -1.5 -2.5 -0.9 -0.8 1.8 Note: The import weighted averages for manufacturing and mining are presented. The simple average ERP for services is presented. Changes in ERP are calculated as ΔERP/(1+ERP) using data inclusive of surcharges.
These results suggest that trade liberalisation has substantially reduced effective protection of South African industries during the 1990s, but the extent of the decline is dependent on the measure of nominal protection used. The average ERP in manufacturing fell from 48% in 1993 to 12.7% in 2004 according to the scheduled rates (inclusive of surcharges) and from 30.8% to 8% between 1993 and 2003 according to the collection rates. As found in the analysis of nominal protection, the use of collection rates leads to lower estimates of the level and decline in protection. The inclusion of surcharges also significantly raises estimates of effective protection, as revealed in the comparative results for 1993. Protection also fell in agriculture and mining, but off a lower base. Tariff distortions on services also diminished and the simple average ERP rose from between -4.5% and -5.5% to approximately -2%.
In comparison to other SA studies, this study finds both higher average protection rates during the early 1990s and also larger declines in ERP over the 1990s, although much of the difference can be accounted for by the inclusion of surcharges. Tsikata (1999) estimates a decline in ERP in manufacturing from 30.2% in 1990 to 22.2% in 1996 (a 6.1% decline). In contrast, this study estimates that ERP fell from 44% to 26% over the same period (a decline of 12.4%). RH (2003) , who use IDC (1996) results, estimate that the simple average ERP in manufacturing fell from 30% in 1993 to 19% in 1999, which is very close to the estimates in this study if surcharges are excluded (33.7% to 19.5%). The inclusion of surcharges raises ERP to 48% in 1993. Finally, as found by FV (2001), declines in ERP are relatively modest between 1988 and 1998 if collection rates are used. However, estimates of liberalisation rise once surcharges are included and the period of analysis is extended to 2004. The sectoral structure of ERP estimated in this study also differs significantly from those of FV with very low correlation coefficients in each year. Estimates of ERP are clearly sensitive to the inclusion of surcharges, the use of different IO or SU tables and different approaches to estimating ad valorem equivalents.
Wide variations in the level and decline in protection are also found at the sector level. Protection, inclusive of surcharges, fell from 1993-2004 in all sectors, but particularly large declines (more than 35%) in ERP, calculated using schedule rates, were experienced in tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, footwear and communication equipment. Despite this, tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel and footwear still remain amongst the top 5 most protected sectors with ERP calculated using schedule rates still exceeding 50%.
The sectors experiencing the greatest declines in ERP based on collection rates are tobacco, leather products, footwear, communication equipment and Professional & scientific equipment. Although these differ slightly from the top 5 using ERP based on scheduled rates, the sectoral pattern of growth in ERP is relatively robust to the choice of scheduled or collection rates. The pairwise correlation coefficient of the change in ERP across sectors is 0.87 and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.86. The sectoral structure of protection using ERP and nominal protection is also very similar, although the former are generally higher. The correlation between nominal and effective protection exceeds 0.8 when using schedule rates and 0.7 when using collection rates for all years. High correlation coefficients are also found by van Seventer (2001).
To facilitate comparison with the results of FV and RH, Table 6 groups sectors according to the extent to which ERP based on schedule rates have changed between 1993 and 2004. The share of GDP in 1993 and 2000 accounted for by these sectors is also presented. As is revealed in Table 6 , the sectors in which ERP fell by more than 25% accounted for 7.6% of GDP using 2000 values. Sectors in the intermediate range (-15% ≤ ΔERP < -25%) and the low range (0 ≤ ΔERP <-15%) accounted for 6.6% and 13.1% of GDP using 2000 values, respectively. By far the largest grouping in terms of GDP share is the category where ERP rose. The sectors experiencing a rise in ERP account for 72.7% of GDP using 2000 values. However, in all cases the rise in protection reflects a reduction in negative ERP, i.e. they reflect a decline in distortions arising from liberalisation. The results of this analysis therefore strongly indicate that less of South African output is distorted by tariffs in 2004 than in 1993. A similar conclusion is reached when using collection rates, earlier base years and ERP excluding surcharges. 
Sensitivity of ERP to non-tariff barriers in agriculture
A critique of existing studies is that they do not take into account distortions arising from non-tariff barriers, which were particularly prevalent in agriculture during the early 1990s. To test the sensitivity of the results to non-tariff barriers, nominal protection on agricultural products in 1993 is raised by a multiple of 3 from 10.5% to 31.4% (using scheduled rates and including surcharges). The results for selected sectors are presented in Table 7 . These results suggest that the failure to properly account for protection within agriculture during the early 1990s may actually bias the GDP weighted economy-wide average effective rate of protection upwards and not downwards as is frequently expected. While the estimated ERP in agriculture in 1993 rises from 9.9% to 49.8%, protection in manufacturing declines from 55% to 50.9%, largely in response to a decline in estimated protection within Food (94.9% to 27.1%). Estimated levels of ERP in other sectors that use agricultural products as intermediate inputs (Beverages, Tobacco and Textiles) also decline.
Anti-export bias
The analyses of nominal and effective rates of protection reveal changes in protection for domestic import-competing producers. This section analyses the effect of trade liberalisation on the competitiveness and profitability of export production.
Tariff protection raises the cost of intermediate inputs, which reduces the profitability of exports that are sold at world prices. During the early 1990s export subsidies under the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS) were used to compensate for the anti-export bias of tariff protection, but these were illegal under WTO rules and were phased out by 1997. Thus lower intermediate input costs for exporters from tariff liberalisation were offset by reductions in export subsidies (Kuhn and Jansen, 1997) .
Alternative export incentive schemes (rebates, refunds and drawbacks of import duties on goods produced for exports) are available, although the number of firms that make use of these facilities appears low (WTO, 1998: 74; Chandra et al. 2001a Chandra et al. , 2001b .Various other WTO friendly supply-side export promoting schemes are also available. These include the Export Marketing and Investment Assistance Schemes (EMIAs), credit facilities with attractive interest rates are provided by the stateowned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) for the promotion of exports of capital goods and services, the Support Programme for Industrial Innovation (SPII), the Export Credit and Foreign Investment Reinsurance scheme and the Export Guarantee scheme. Specific schemes for small medium and micro-enterprises exporters include the Small/Medium Manufacturing Development Programme (SMMDP), the Short-Term Export Finance Guarantee Facility and special terms in the EMIAs (WTO, 1998) . However, awareness and usage by small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) of these facilities is extremely low (Chandra et al., 2001b) .
To evaluate the impact of tariff liberalisation on the relative incentive for export production, measures of the anti-export bias are calculated. Following Kuhn and Jansen (1997) and Van Seventer (2001) , the anti-export bias (AEB) on product j is measured as: 
The anti-export bias, thus measures the extent to which trade policies increase value added when a firm sells goods on the domestic market compared to export markets. Values in excess of 1 reflect a bias towards the domestic market.
Subsidies, tax rebates and exemptions lower the estimated XRP j . To capture these effects, the export incentives arising from GEIS, drawback of duties, rebates of duties and transport costs are derived from the Kuhn and Jansen (1997 ) data for 1993 , 1996 . The data for 1994 and 1995 are interpolated using compound growth rates. Data for 1998 Data for and 2000 Data for -2004 are set equal to the period 1999, while 1997 is the average of 1996 and 1998. Notes: The export incentives are derived from the data presented in Kuhn and Jansen (1997) . The anti-export bias for agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services are calculated using the average ERP and XRP at the SIC 1 digit level. The SIC 1-digit level values of ERP and XRP are in turn import weighted averages for manufacturing and mining, but are the simple average for the total economy and services.
As shown in Table 8 , tariff liberalisation has substantially reduced the implicit tax on export production. In 1993 the import weighted average anti-export bias in manufacturing fell from 2.6 in 1993 to 1.4 in 2004. Moderate declines in the anti-export bias were also experienced in mining and agriculture. At the sector level large declines were experienced in tobacco, textiles, wearing apparel, leather products and footwear. Nevertheless, relatively high levels of anti-export bias (> 1.9) remain in these sectors.
However, much of the decline in the anti-export bias during the early 1990s was offset by the phasing out of GEIS. After including the export incentives provided under GEIS, the average anti-export bias, weighted by imports, rose from 1.4 to 1.5 between 1993 and 1996. Further tariff liberalisation then reduced the anti-export bias to 1.3. Thus, after the inclusion of export incentives, there has been only a marginal improvement in the anti-export bias during the 1990s. This may explain South Africa's mediocre export performance compared with many other middle-income economies during the 1990s. (Alves and Kaplan, 2004) .
International comparison
In Table 9 average nominal MFN tariffs in SA are benchmarked against a range countries and regions for which consistent data available for a year in both periods 1993-95 and 2002-04. 19 The data are obtained from the Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) database. The difficulties surrounding the analysis of protection within a single country are compounded when comparing protection across various countries. In calculating the averages in Table 9 , only the ad valorem tariffs are included and potentially high levels of protection from non-ad valorem (including mixed tariffs) are ignored. For example, the simple average for South Africa between 1993 and 95 rises from 16% to 18.6% once ad valorem equivalents, as calculated in this paper, are included. Nevertheless, some insight on the relative level of protection and trend over time can be obtained through such comparisons.
As shown in Table 9 , the level of protection in South Africa appears to be slightly lower than other lower-middle-income countries, but is substantially higher than the average for high-income OECD countries. Looking at the change in tariffs, average protection has fallen in most regions, with particularly large declines occurring in lower-middle-income and low-income economies. While tariff protection has declined in South Africa (-4.9%), it has not declined at a significantly faster pace than the average for other lower-middle-income economies (-5.3%). These results suggest that the liberalisation process in South Africa has not been 'excessive' compared to its counterparts. Few consistent relationships emerge. Changes in output are positively correlated with changes in protection as measured using scheduled tariffs, collection rates and ERP (duty and tariff), suggesting that relatively low output growth occurred in sectors experiencing relatively large declines in protection. However, no such relationship is found for employment. Although the pairwise correlation coefficients are largely positive for the nominal and effective tariffs, they are insignificant. Similarly, no consistency relationship is found between the change in protection and changes in export orientation, import penetration or openness. This cursory analysis therefore finds a limited correlation between tariff liberalisation and changes in the sectoral structure of employment, exports and imports. However, a more comprehensive analysis with appropriately specified functional relationships between trade liberalisation and these variables is required to identify the conditional relationships.
Conclusion
This paper constructs a new data set to re-evaluate changes in nominal and effective protection of South African industries from the late 1980s. Estimates of protection are found to be sensitive to the use of collections duties or scheduled tariff rates, with the latter showing both a higher level of protection and greater decline in protection than the former. However, the structure of nominal and effective protection is relatively insensitive to the choice of tariff measure.
Estimates of the level of effective protection are also shown to be sensitive to the choice of InputOutput or Supply-Use table. Most estimates of effective protection in SA use a single table for the entire period of analysis. While this biases estimates of the level of protection, evidence suggests that the structure of protection across sectors and time is largely unaffected.
Failure to account for non-tariff barriers, that were particularly prevalent in agriculture during the early 1990s, also biases estimates of effective protection. However, the bias on the aggregate level of protection for the economy is not necessarily downwards. Sensitivity tests show that raising nominal protection on agriculture raises estimates of effective protection in agriculture, but lowers effective protection in manufacturing, particularly in those sectors such as food products that use agricultural products as intermediate inputs.
This paper also presents estimates of the anti-export bias arising from tariff protection. While tariff liberalisation has reduced the anti-export bias, the removal of export subsidies under GEIS has offset much of the gains. Further liberalisation may be required to improve the profitability of export production and hence export performance. Finally, tariff liberalisation has led to significant reductions in the level of nominal and effective protection during the 1990s. Average nominal protection in manufacturing using scheduled rates and including surcharges fell from 22.9% in 1994 to 8.2% in 2004. Effective protection in manufacturing fell from 52.2 to 13.8% over the same period. The decline in protection is robust to the exclusion of surcharges and the use of collection duties. Reductions in protection occurred in almost all traded sectors. The paper therefore finds that less output is subject to tariff distortions in 2004, than in the early 1990s.
However, further progress can be made. The tariff structure is still complex with a high number of tariff bands, domestic spikes and nuisance tariffs. High nominal and effective protection remains in sectors such as clothing, textiles, footwear and tobacco. Tariff protection also declined at no faster pace than other developing or middle-income economies. Liberalisation has thus not been 'excessive' once benchmarked against comparator countries.
The availability of detailed tariff data over a number of years, as used in this study, now enable a more rigorous analysis of the impact of trade liberalisation on production, employment and poverty in the South African economy.
